It was 30 years ago that the first issue of New Zealand Bridge was published. Initially it appeared five times a year, the first issue dated March 1965, with an annual subscription rate of 10 shillings, or 2/6 per copy.

The original editor was Harold Fenton, assisted by Walter Linderman, Len McKillip and Jock Hutchison. The first issue included articles by Bruce Bell, John Wignall and George Peche – all still subscribers to the magazine.

The first editorial contained the following: "Contact Bridge in this country has long needed a stimulus and it is our fervent desire that ‘New Zealand Bridge’ will provide the necessary spur. Our object is to bring a closer harmony between the various bridge playing communities of New Zealand by exchanging viewpoints and becoming familiar with each other’s activities".

Nothing really has changed. It is gratifying that despite problems along the way, the magazine is in a strong position and we hope fulfills these aims.

As a tribute to the pioneers of this magazine, this issue contains one of the original articles from March 1965, by the late Jock Hutchison. I think you will enjoy reading it, whether it is the first, third or thirty time.

Thirty years ago, alerting was not an issue. Today we seem very concerned with the subject. I am firmly in favour of the use of the alert card or other such signal. However, I feel it is appropriate to restate why alerting is required.

You should alert your opponents if your partner has made a bid which your opponents are not likely to understand from their basic bridge knowledge. This includes the alerting of some natural bids as where the direct raise of a 1ª opening bid to 3ª shows 0-9 points. An alert or indeed a failure to alert never takes away the right of an opponent to ask about your systemic agreement or understanding of a partner’s bid. However, if a 2© opening bid shows hearts and a second suit or a 1§ opening four or more hearts, the opponents would see no particular reason to ask about the unusual feature. That is the proper use of an alert.

An alert card is not really to inform one’s opponents that partner’s 1NT opening showed 16-18 points or that the double of 2ª was responsive, negative or "any which way you like" values double. That is the kind of information the opponents can discover by asking at their turn. There are two important points to make here.

Firstly, I believe that players ask too many irrelevant questions, questions totally irrelevant to the next action they will take at the table. They will pass a double whether it is for penalties or for take-out. If it does not affect your next bid, don’t ask and save both time and possible ethical considerations that may arise from the explanation given.

Then there is the inference given to asking. It is widely assumed that if you ask and pass, that you are conveying information to partner that do not hold a flat yaborough. You have the right to ask at your turn no matter what you hold. This point may seem in contradiction with the one above though I do not believe this is the case. Don’t ask irrelevant questions though the fact you have asked should not convey any information about your hand.

Where, then, is this leading? From the above you can glean that an alert may result in an ethical problem, often, of couse, when the partners have different understandings about a call. I believe we can improve on this country’s current alerting requirements. It is unfortunate that the National Association are currently reviewing this issue and appear to be only doing some fine-tuning to the current approach rather than to be taking a more practical, back-to-basics approach to alerting.

Recently, I attended Australia’s National Congress in Canberra and was most impressed with that country’s Alert Regulations introduced in 1994. They introduced the term "Self-Alerting Calls". Such calls may not be natural though by definition they are calls which opponents should be prepared for and thus should NOT be alerted. "Self-Alerting Calls" are the following:

1. All doubles
2. All redoubles
3. All skip-bids
4. All cue-bids of opponents’ suits
5. All calls above 3NT

This would eliminate the problems caused with alerting doubles and other grey areas like the alerting of cue-bids, splinters and other high-level bids unlikely to be of any relevance to the opponents during the bidding.

Nothing is that simple. There are calls above 3NT which should be alerted (eg. a 4§ opening showing hearts). Some skip-bids also require an alert like the 2© opening referred to above. To cater for these introduce a Special Alert which would override such a Self-Alerting Call so that the bid could (and should) be alerted.

Also in Canberra players were given and had to complete very simple system cards. There were no more than half a dozen lines to complete, a one minute job not like the cards I see in this country. The cards were readable , too. At a glance you could ascertain the strength of a 1NT opening or a jump overcall or the minimum number of cards for opening 1§ or 1¨ . Use such cards here and eliminate the alerting of short clubs or diamonds or a balanced 1NT opening, irrespictive of strength.

If we cut out the superflous alerts and remember we can ask questions at our turn to call without fear or passing information, then the alert procedure will be more widely understood and used in the necessary situations.